W e examine the relationship between investment banks' initial public offering (IPO) market shares and their prior IPO underpricing in the new IPO market for China-based companies on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange. To gain expertise in Chinese business practices, investment banks have the incentive to obtain business in this new IPO market by providing high offer prices to the issuer, leading to less underpricing and less money on the table. We hypothesize and find that the less an investment bank underprices Chinabased company IPOs, the greater its subsequent market share of China-based company IPOs in the Hong Kong Stock Exchange. Furthermore, this relationship is driven by a bank's initial China-based company IPO deals. These results suggest that in new IPO markets, investment banks' initial market shares, obtained through lower underpricing, help them grow their market shares in later periods, possibly through the expertise gained in the initial business.
Introduction
Previous studies examining the role played by investment banks on the underpricing of initial public offerings (IPOs) and their subsequent IPO business market shares in the United States document mixed evidence. In particular, studies either find no relationship or find that the greater the underpricing by an investment bank, the greater its subsequent IPO market share (see Krigman et al. 2001 , Nanda and Yun 1997 , Dunbar 2000 , Hoberg 2007 . 1 These results suggest that competition among investment banks for IPO business does not mitigate IPO underpricing. Hoberg (2007) and Dunbar (2000) argue that investment banks that have superior ability to value companies can obtain IPO business even if they persistently underprice IPOs. A natural question is how do investment banks gain such expertise? To provide insights into this question, we examine IPO underpricing and investment banks' subsequent IPO market shares in a new IPO market. Specifically, we examine the IPOs of China-based companies in the Hong Kong Stock Exchange, where investment banks are likely to be on an equal footing in the initial years in terms of their ability to value these companies.
In 1993, the Chinese-Hong Kong Memorandum of Regulatory Cooperation allowed Chinese companies to be listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange; these shares are called H-shares. At that time, all investment banks were competing in the new IPO market on an equal footing in terms of their ability to value Chinese companies, because Chinese companies were different from Hong Kong companies and were new to these investment banks. This new IPO market provides an excellent setting to examine (a) whether investment bank competition can help mitigate IPO underpricing, and (b) whether investment banks can gain competitive advantage by obtaining the initial IPO business in new markets, i.e., learning by doing.
China-based company IPOs on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange are different from Hong Kong-based company IPOs in a number of dimensions. First, China-based company IPOs are related to state owned enterprises (SOEs), which are markedly different from privately owned Hong Kong-based company IPOs (Fan and Wong 2002) . Second, securities, corporate, and minority rights laws are different in China, especially in comparison to Hong Kong (De Jonge 2008) . Third, the relationship-based networking known as guanxi is a key component of doing business in China (Peng and Luo 2000) . Given these differences between Chinese and Hong Kong companies, an investment bank's superior ability to value Hong Kong companies is not likely to translate into a superior ability to value Chinese companies. It follows that in the new market, all of the investment banks would have been on an equal footing in terms of their ability to value China-based company IPOs. The price competition would thus have been more intense for China-based company IPOs than for Hong Kong-based company IPOs. We thus hypothesize that the lower the magnitude of underpricing of China-based company IPOs by an investment bank, the higher will be its subsequent market share of such IPOs in Hong Kong; for Hong Kong-based company IPOs this relationship is not expected to exist, consistent with evidence in the United States as documented in previous studies.
The potential for China's phenomenal growth was well acknowledged in the 1990s (see Liaw 2007) . Investment banks that strategically chose to expand into the Chinese market would have had the incentive to underprice China-based company IPOs in Hong Kong less, with a view to obtaining business and gaining expertise in valuing Chinese companies. In other words, obtaining China-based company IPO business in the initial years would enable investment banks to gain expertise in the new market. In addition, obtaining China-based company IPO business would enable investment banks to establish and build key relationships, i.e., guanxi, with the government and the business community, which is a key ingredient of doing business in China (Seligman 1999, Peng and Luo 2000) . However, once some of the investment banks have expertise on China, the incentive to lower the magnitude of underpricing for Chinabased company IPOs is not as strong as in the initial deals. As such, we expect that the relationship between investment banks' lower HIPO underpricing and their higher subsequent HIPO market shares is driven by the initial few deals. 2 Our sample consists of all China-and Hong Kongbased company IPOs handled by investment banks that handled at least one China-based company IPO 2 Hereafter we use the term lower or less underpricing to imply the lower magnitude of underpricing. For example, consider an IPO with the true valuation of $100, which the investment bank typically offers at $80. For China-based company IPOs due to intense competition they offer it at $90. As such, instead of the typical $20 underpricing, the China-based company IPO underpricing is $10. This lower magnitude of underpricing is referred to as lower/less underpricing.
in Hong Kong during 1993 Kong during -2007 . Similar to Dunbar (2000) , we conduct an investment bank level analysis with investment banks' China-and Hong Kong-based company IPO market shares as the dependent variable. Specifically, we regress each investment bank's annual IPO market share on its average IPO underpricing over the prior two years for China-and Hong Kong-based company IPOs separately. We control for the prior years' IPO market shares and the future years' average abnormal returns and stock price volatility of the IPO companies (see Dunbar 2000) . As predicted in the hypothesis, we find that the less an investment bank underprices a Chinabased company IPO, the greater its subsequent Chinabased company IPO market share; this relationship is not observed for Hong Kong-based company IPOs. We also find that the relationship between investment banks' lower underpricing of China-based company IPOs and greater subsequent market shares is stronger for the initial IPO deals.
We then provide some evidence on the benefits that investment banks gain in the Chinese financial services industry possibly from the China-related business expertise they gain by handling China-based company IPOs in the Hong Kong Stock Exchange. We do this in two ways. First, we choose one investment bank from our sample that had one of the lowest underpricing of Chinese-based company IPOs in the initial periods and held informal discussions with top-level, vice presidents about their strategy to gain entry into the Chinese financial services industry. Although the investment bank's officials did not indicate an explicit strategy of lowering the underpricing for the initial deals, the officials stated that they made all efforts to obtain the China-based company IPO business by helping issuers maximize the amount of capital raised in the offering. This additional effort helped them gain significant experience in the nuances of Chinese business practices as well as gain important competitive advantage in the Chinese financial services industry. As examples the officials cited that they were one of the first to obtain two important licenses in China: one for underwriting IPOs in the Chinese stock exchanges and one for engaging in brokerage and trading activities in China. In addition, it was chosen to handle one of the biggest Chinese company IPOs in global stock exchanges. Second, we empirically examine whether the market shares of investment bank's China-based company IPO market share in the Hong Kong Stock Exchange correlates with its subsequent market share in the Chinese financial services industry. Our empirical analyses show that the investment banks with greater market shares in the early stages of the Hong Kong Stock Exchange China-based company IPO market have greater subsequent market shares in the Chinese stock exchange IPO market. This provides some evidence that obtaining business of handling the initial China-based company IPOs in the Hong Kong Stock Exchange helps investment banks gain expertise in Chinese business practices and obtain increased market shares in the Chinese market as well.
We contribute to the IPO literature in two important ways. First, we provide insights into how investment banks gain expertise and become high-quality investment banks. Although Hoberg (2007) provides evidence that some investment banks persistently underprice in an established IPO market because of their superior private information, we show that investment banks exhibit lower underpricing for the first few deals when entering a new market and this enables them to gain expertise and superior private information to help them better compete in the market. Second, our findings have implications for agency issues between investment banks and IPO firms and the underpricing phenomenon.
3 Our findings suggest that agency problems between investment banks and IPO firms are indeed mitigated by competition (e.g., Baron and Holmström 1980, Baron 1982) , and that the persistence of IPO underpricing in developed markets is likely due to competitive forces.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the institutional setting and develops the hypotheses. Section 3 presents the empirical analyses. Section 4 provides concluding remarks.
Motivation, Background, and
Hypotheses Development 2.1. Motivation and Background Recent research examining the relationship between investment banks' market shares and IPO underpricing in the United States finds that IPO underpricing is either not associated or is positively associated with investment banks' market shares (see Beatty and Welch 1996 , Krigman et al. 2001 , Nanda and Yun 1997 and Dunbar 2000 , Logue et al. 2002 . These findings suggest that competition among investment banks does not mitigate IPO underpricing. Hoberg (2007) provides one rationale for why competition does not mitigate IPO underpricing. He develops an analytical model and shows that investment banks with superior private information that leads to more accurate valuation of IPOs will exhibit more underpricing than their rivals. He then empirically shows that investment banks that underprice IPOs more will continue to do so in the future. If this underpricing persistence is driven by superior private information, then the natural question is how do some investment banks gain such expertise? We examine this question in a new IPO market setting; specifically, the IPOs of Chinese companies in the Hong Kong Stock Exchange. In this new market all of the investment banks are likely to be on an equal footing in terms of their ability to value Chinese companies. In the following section, we provide a brief institutional background and lay out the empirical expectations. Investment banks' private information on Hong Kong companies and their valuation ability is not likely to translate into superior knowledge of Chinese companies, because the business environments for Chinese and Hong Kong companies are significantly different in at least three dimensions. First, the primary objective of an IPO in Hong Kong by a Chinabased company was to raise money for state owned enterprises that were starved of much needed capital. These companies face different agency issues than Hong Kong public companies (see Fan and Wong 2002) . Second, the securities, corporate, and minority right laws were ambiguous and nascent in China. Furthermore, the importance of political connections in business and the political tensions between the provincial and the central ministries that helped shape the laws in China were not well understood (De Jonge 2008 , Green 2004 ). Third, relationship-based business networking, known as guanxi, is a key component of doing business in China, primarily because judicial enforcement was not reliable, even when state agencies are involved (Xin and Pearce 1996, Seligman 1999 ). These differences across Chinese and Hong Kong companies contributed to the difficulties that investment banks faced when trying to translate their competitive advantage of superior private 4 The discussion of institutional details is drawn from De Jonge (2008) and Green (2004) . These studies describe the evolution of corporate and security-related rules and laws in China. De Jonge (2008) uses the first nine China-based company IPOs to illustrate how Chinese corporate and security laws evolved. 5 Although Hong Kong is an integral part of China, the principle of "one country, two systems," is adopted and practiced. information and/or ability to value Hong Kong IPOs to superior private information and/or ability to value China-based company IPOs. The lack of a competitive advantage in the new IPO market would increase the competition among investment banks for China-based company IPOs.
In addition, the competition among investment banks for China-based company IPOs was likely to be more intense because of China's large growth potential. The China-based company IPOs market was large; for example, Lee and Chang (2003) To reap the benefits of the future growth potential in China, the intensity of competition among investment banks to obtain China-based company IPO business in the early period would have been high. This argument is consistent with the theoretical consequences of repeated agency problems (see, e.g., Baron and Holmström 1980, Baron 1982) , which suggests that the potential for obtaining future business is a mechanism for mitigating agency problems.
These arguments together suggest that investment banks that strategically choose to gain expertise in the Chinese business market to gain future China-based company IPO market shares will underprice these IPOs less. This is stated as an empirically testable hypothesis below.
Hypothesis 1A (H1A). The less an investment bank underprices China-based company IPOs in the Hong Kong Stock Exchange, the greater its subsequent market share of the China-based company IPO market.
In contrast, we expect competition among investment banks for Hong Kong-based company IPOs to be similar to those in other free markets such as the United States. Similar to the United States, Hong Kong consistently ranks near the top of the roughly 154 territories/countries in the Index of Economic Freedom Report, whereas China is at the bottom of the rankings (see, for example, Gul et al. 2010 , Fung et al. 2013 . Thus, we expect that the relationship between Hong Kong-based company IPO underpricing by an investment bank and their subsequent IPO market shares to be similar to the findings in the United States; that is, we either expect a positive relationship or no relationship (see Krigman et al. 2001 , Nanda and Yun 1997 , Dunbar 2000 , Hoberg 2007 ). We state this as a null hypothesis.
Hypothesis 1B (H1B). An investment bank's underpricing of Hong Kong-based company IPOs in the Hong Kong Stock Exchange is not related to its subsequent market share of the Hong Kong-based company IPO market.
Investment banks that wish to gain entry and establish a strategic presence in the China market have an incentive to underprice less in the initial deals so as to gain a competitive advantage in terms of superior private information and/or better ability to value China companies, i.e., learning by doing. Those investment banks that obtain China-based company IPO business in the initial years will build expertise in the business environment in China and gain a competitive advantage in later years. Once they obtain expertise and superior ability through the initial deals, they will be able to leverage their superior private information to their competitive advantage. Based on this learningby-doing argument we expect H1A to be driven by the first few China-based company IPO deals.
In addition, the institutional arrangement of the quota system was removed in 2001. In 1993, China implemented a quota system for IPOs as a multistage approval system starting with the local/regional government, going up to the ministry and national party level. Each province was allotted a quota of SOEs for listing, and it was up to the local leadership to determine which firms would list.
7 Although the local and regional authorities selected the companies to be listed, it had to be de facto approved by the central authorities. 8 Legal scholars argue that the involvement of regulatory authorities was necessary in the initial years, because corporate and security laws needed to be changed and stop gap rules 7 The provincial governments used the quotas for SOEs that were starved for capital, and such SOEs were not necessarily the best candidates for listing based on the economics of the enterprise itself. To meet the listing requirements in Hong Kong, SOEs were restructured and bundled so that the profitability requirements could be met. In some cases, the management personnel did not know each other until just before going public. As such, Chinabased company IPOs are not necessarily better performers when compared to IPOs issuers of the local Hong Kong firms. 8 De Jonge (2008) illustrates how tensions between central and provincial authorities in China affected the choice of IPOs candidates. For example, localities that failed to subscribe to the assigned state treasury bonds by the central Finance Ministry were not given a preference in the allocation of listing quotas. needed to be instituted as part of the evolution of corporate and security laws. Up until 2000 when the quota system was eliminated, the de facto issuer was the government. The investment banks could not conduct conferences, identify good target companies, or market their services effectively in the initial years.
In essence, the competitive intensity among investment banks in the initial years is likely to be high either because of the institutional arrangement of the quota system or the learning by doing. Although it is difficult to disentangle the effects of institutional arrangement from learning by doing, we expect H1A to be driven by the initial deals of China-based company IPOs when the investment banks are gaining expertise. This is formally stated in the following hypothesis.
Hypothesis 2 (H2).
The relationship between an investment bank's lower underpricing of China-based company IPOs in Hong Kong and its greater subsequent market share of the China-based company IPO market is stronger in the investment bank's initial China-based company IPO deals than in later deals.
One important alternative explanation for H1A and H2 stems from the investors' demand for Chinabased company IPOs. Specifically, if the investors' demand for China-based company IPOs is low in the initial years because of the uncertainty of China's transition to the market-based economy, and higher in later years, then the underpricing would exhibit an increasing trend (Derrien 2005) . We address this explanation in three ways. First, we employ a reverse regression specification (see Equations (1) and (2)), in which we regress current IPO market shares on lagged IPO underpricing at the investment bank level so that the time-varying investor demand is controlled by year fixed effects. Second, we include the ex post stock market-based measures of uncertainty and performance to control for investor demand, similar to Dunbar (2000) . Third, we use the IPO underpricing model to test the hypotheses, which enables us to include trend, revision of offer price, and first day trading volume to control for trends in investor demand.
Empirical Analyses

Sample and Data
We consider all 103 China-based company IPOs in the Hong Kong Stock Exchange (HIPOs) from 1993 to 2007. After eliminating nine IPOs that belong to the financial industry and the nine that have offer price to sales ratios greater than 10, our final sample contains 85 China-based company IPOs. 9 We hereafter refer to the China-based company (H-shares) IPOs in the Hong Kong Stock Exchange as HIPOs and the Hong Kong company IPOs as HKIPOs. Corresponding to the HIPOs, we consider all of the nonfinancial HKIPOs (N = 236) for which prospectuses are available, that are handled by investment banks that have also handled at least one HIPO. This matching of HKIPOs to the investment banks that have handled HIPOs controls for the institutional investor-clientele effect and the investment banks' business-related expertise. The stock prices and financial information are from the PACAP and OSIRIS databases. The sample selection criteria are summarized in panel A of Table 1 .
Panels B and C of Table 1 10 Fifty-seven percent of the HKIPOs and 66% of the HIPOs belong to the "Industrials" sector, i.e., the industry distribution of the HIPOs and HKIPOs are roughly similar. This is partly attributable to the investment bank matching criterion.
IPO underpricing is measured by the day-onereturn, D1R, computed as the end of day-one price over offer price minus one. Figure 1 plots the D1Rs of the HKIPOs and HIPOs in the sample. The D1Rs of the HKIPOs are generally higher than those of the HIPOs in the initial years (before 2002); in later years (after 2002) , the D1Rs of the HIPOs are similar to (and in some years higher than) those of the HKIPOs. In essence, the HIPO D1Rs exhibit an increasing trend over the period. One potential explanation for this phenomenon is based on demand side arguments. Benveniste and Spindt (1989) show that underpricing is necessary to stimulate investor expressways, three are engaged in mining, and one is in oil and gas exploration. Correspondingly, we do not consider the 45 IPOs of Hong Kong-based companies with offer price to sales ratio of greater than 10 (for the sample of Hong Kong-based company IPOs, there are a few investment companies in addition to oilfield services and infrastructure construction companies). The business models of these firms require capital before revenues can be generated. As such, the prior sales are very low or nonexistent in most of these cases. Expertise in these business models may not translate into general expertise in Chinese business. However, to the extent that this enables investment banks to establish relationships with government officials and the business community these China-based company IPOs may be strategically important. As a sensitivity test, we include these observations and find similar results. 10 The annual distribution of the HKIPOs handled by investment banks that have not handled any of the HIPOs shows a similar to pattern to the HKIPOs in panel B. In total there are 268 such HKIPOs. demand. Derrien (2005) analytically demonstrates and provides evidence that investor demand is positively associated with IPO underpricing. Thus, the trend in HIPO underpricing could be driven by the changes in investor demand instead of completion and learning by doing. To mitigate the problem of investor demand driving our results, we consider investment banks' market shares as the dependent variable in our primary research design (see the following section). Furthermore, in an additional test using the IPO underpricing model, we include the first day trading volume and revision in offer price to control for investor demand. Test of H1 To test H1A and H1B, we regress the investment bank's IPO market share on the lagged investment bank's IPO underpricing. The unit of analysis is the annual market share of each investment bank that has handled at least one HIPO during the sample period. We estimate the following equation:
where HIPOMS (HKIPOMS) is the investment bank's market share in year t and is measured as the proportion of HIPO (HKIPO) offer proceeds that the investment bank handles in year t. 11 In cases when more than one lead investment bank handles the same IPO, the offer proceeds are allocated equally among these lead investment banks to compute their market shares. 12 The dependent variable is HIPOMS (HKIPOMS) to test H1A (H1B).
The test variable for H1A (H1B) is HIPOD1R t−1 t−2 (HKIPOD1R t−1 t−2 , computed as the offer sizeweighted average D1R of the HIPOs (HKIPOs) handled by the investment bank over the previous two 11 Alternatively, we measure the investment bank's market shares as the number of HIPO and HKIPO over the total number of HIPO and HKIPO, respectively, and obtain similar results. 12 We also consider the following two ways of allocating offer proceeds to the lead investment banks: (1) the total offer proceeds is allocated to each investment bank because these banks have a joint and several liability and hence have an equal incentive to learn about Chinese business (note that the annual market share in this method can be greater than 100%); (2) allocating offer share proceeds based on the investment bank's prior two year's HKIPO and HIPO market shares, i.e., weight the market share by prior experience. The results are similar to those reported here. years. 13 Based on H1A (H1B), we expect 1 ( 2 ) to be negative (positive or zero) when the dependent variable in Equation (1) is HIPOMS (HKIPOMS). We estimate Equation (1) using the ordinary least squares (OLS) procedure and correct the standard errors by clustering on investment bank and year. 14 We include the lagged market shares of HIPOs and HKIPOs to control for investment bank quality effects. The inclusion of a lagged dependent variable as an additional explanatory variable makes the research design equivalent to a change specification in the econometric sense. 15 We also include the average prior D1Rs of an investment bank's HKIPOs (HIPOs) over the previous two years when the dependent variable is HIPOMS (HKIPOMS), to control for investment bank specific effects that influence all of the IPOs; this allows us to explore the spillover effects of the HKIPOs onto HIPOs (or HIPOs onto HKIPOs).
To control for the nature and type of IPOs handled by specific investment banks, we include the average value-weighted market-adjusted abnormal returns and volatility for the HIPOs and HKIPOs for the three years after the IPO, corresponding to the IPOs in years t − 1 and t − 2 that were handled by the investment bank. Specifically, these ex post measures of uncertainty control for the difference in the uncertainty associated with the valuation of the HIPO and HKIPO firms and investor demand factors that are likely to be correlated with the test variables, HIPOD1R and HKIPOD1R in years t − 1 and t − 2 (see Dunbar 2000) . All variable definitions are included in the appendix.
The sample for the analysis includes 40 investment banks for each sample year. 16 Because we need data for two years prior to year t, the test period covers 13 We consider the following three ways of averaging D1Rs: (1) abnormal D1R, computed as the difference between D1R and predicted D1R based on the D1R determinant model in Equation (4) (without the HIPO indicator variables, i.e., test variables) to account for investor demand driven factors associated with D1Rs; (2) annual mean-differenced D1R over all HIPOs and HKIPOs, respectively, to account for year effects in D1Rs; and (3) issuer's sales-weighted D1R to account for client size on investor demand. The results are similar to those reported here. 14 Given the number of zeros in the dependent variable, we use the Tobit procedure in a sensitivity test and obtain similar results. We also use the seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) procedure because the residuals of Equation (1) when HIPOMS and HKIPOMS are the dependent variables are likely to be correlated. In addition, the SUR procedure allows us to statistically test the difference between 1 and 2 when the dependent variables are HIPOMS and HKIPOMS, respectively, which are reported. 15 In a sensitivity test we estimate Equation (1) using the change in market shares as the dependent variable and obtain similar results. 16 We eliminate two China-based state owned investment banks (BOCI Asia Ltd. and China International Capital Corporation) and consider only the Hong Kong-based investment banks because they face a different incentive structure. Liaw (2007) Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics of the variables. The mean HIPO market share (HIPOMS) is 4%, and the mean HKIPO market share is 1%, i.e., 0.01. This shows that HKIPOs are more uniformly distributed across the investment banks than HIPOs. The lagged HIPO (HKIPO) underpricing is 3% (2%). More than 75% of the market shares are zero, because if in a year an investment bank is not a lead investment bank for any IPO, the market share is measured as zero; the assumption here is that all of the 40 banks actively compete for the IPO and some fail to win any underwriting business for a year. To the extent that some of the zero market shares reflect an investment bank's strategic choice to not compete for IPOs, it should lower the explanatory power of the model. Panel B of Table 2 provides the correlations among the variables. The correlation between the lagged HIPOD1R and HIPOMS is −0.16 and is statistically significant at the 1% level, which is consistent with H1A. The correlation between the lagged HKIPOD1R and HKIPOMS is 0.11 and is significant at the 1% level, which is consistent with H1B.
Panel C of Table 2 provides the results of estimating Equation (1). The first (last) two columns present the results with the dependent variable HIPOMS (HKIPOMS). We show the results with and without the future performance of the IPO variables because, by design, one year of the future IPO performance includes the year of the dependent variable. As predicted in H1A, for the model including all of the control variables, the coefficient estimate on HIPOD1R t−1 t−2 is −1.03 (t-statistic = −3 82) when the of how the Chinese authorities groom their banks to learn Western market-based financial economics with the ultimate objective of becoming globally prominent banks. The incentives for these banks are different for at least two reasons. First, these banks do not face intense competition as the other investment banks in obtaining HIPO business. Second, instead of learning about China businesses, their objective would have been to learn and establish relationships with Hong Kong investors. As such, these banks have an incentive to "favor" the investors and thereby increase underpricing. To test H1A and H1B, we eliminate these investment banks. 17 We follow the same procedure for HKIPOs as well. As such, HKIPOs serve as a pseudo-control for any bias we may induce from this measurement choice. In a sensitivity test, we exclude all of the HIPOMS that pertain to the first deal within the sample because by definition the prior D1Rs for these observations are zero and the results are similar to those reported in the paper. 
( HIPO market share is the dependent variable. The results are similar when the future performance variables are not included. In addition, the lagged HKI-POD1R is positively related to the HIPO market share, indicating a spillover effect, possibly due to investor clientele as argued in Hoberg (2007) . As predicted in H1B, for the model including all of the control variables, the coefficient estimate on HKIPOD1R t−1 t−2 is 0.01 (t-statistic = 0 90) when the HKIPO market share is the dependent variable. We test the difference in the coefficient estimates on HIPOD1R t−1 t−2 in the HIPOMS regression, and the HKIPOD1R t−1 t−2 in the HKIPOMS regression, using the seemingly unrelated regression procedure; the difference is statistically significant (F -statistic = 14 83). The results are similar when the future returns and price volatility controls are excluded from the model.
18
18 In a sensitivity test, we include TREND in Equation (1) and find that the coefficient on TREND for HIPOMS is 0.0004 (t-statistic = 0 14) and for HKIPOMS it is 0.0004 (t-statistic = 0 59); all of the other results are similar.
As mentioned earlier, the assumption in the research design is that all of the 40 investment banks compete for all of the HIPOs and HKIPOs in all of the years in our sample period. However, it is possible that an investment bank will strategically choose not to compete in a particular IPO market in a given year, and therefore it might not be valid to treat them as being unsuccessful in obtaining a future market share and assign them zero market shares. Specifically, based on this assumption, the market shares of more than 75% of the observations are zero for both HIPOs and HKIPOs. Since we use the same measurement procedure for both HIPOs and HKIPOs, and obtain results supporting H1A (negative association between prior day one returns and market shares for HIPO) and H1B (no association between prior dayone returns and market shares for HKIPOs), HKIPOs act as a pseudo-control and provide a degree of confidence that our results are not driven by this assumption. However, to check if our results are affected by this assumption, we perform a battery of sensitivity tests. First, we eliminate observations with zero HIPOMS, under the assumption that these investment banks did not compete in the HIPO market in those years. There are 160 observations satisfying this criterion. Using this sample, we repeat the main analyses of Table 2 , panel C. We find that the coefficient on HIPOD1R t−1 t−2 is −1.11 (t-statistic = −3 21) when HIPOMS t is the dependent variable, and the coefficient on HKIPOD1R t−1 t−2 is 0.04 (t-statistic = 1 21) when HKIPOMS t is the dependent variable; the difference is statistically significant (F -statistic = 7 37).
Second, we eliminate observations with zero HKIPOMS, resulting in a sample with 221 observations. We do this to ensure that the investment banks are active at least in the HKIPO market so the zero HIPOMS are less likely to be cases where the investment banks strategically chose not to compete in the HIPO market in a given year. The results corresponding to panel C of Table 2 using this sample show that the coefficient on HIPOD1R t−1 t−2 is −1.81 (t-statistic = −2 88) when HIPOMS t is the dependent variable and the coefficient on HKIPOD1R t−1 t−2 is 0.05 (t-statistic = 1 36) when HKIPOMS t is the dependent variable; the difference is statistically significant (F -statistic = 8.66).
Overall, the results reported in panel C of Table 2 and the sensitivity analysis eliminating the observations with zero HIPOMS or HKIPOMS provide support for both hypothesis H1A and H1B and suggest that our results are not driven by the discussed assumption.
19 19 For both of the these samples, the tests of H2 are also similar to those reported in panel B of Table 3 presents the HIPO underpricing and the number of HIPOs handled by investment banks. We use the year 2000 as the cut-off year because in this year the quota system for choosing HIPOs was eliminated and the move toward a market-driven selection was initiated (see the discussion preceding H2). For the 1993-2000 (2001-2007) period, the mean IPO underpricing, i.e., the D1R, for the HIPOs of the investment banks that handle five or less HIPOs is 17% (27%) compared with 9% (13%) for the HIPOs of investment banks that handle more than five HIPOs. This provides initial support for H2. To test H2, we augment Equation (1) as follows:
where INITIAL is measured using two proxies. The first proxy is based on the institutional regime change in 2000 that removed the quota system (see discussion of H2), i.e., INITIAL = PRE2000. The second proxy is based on the first five HIPO deals, i.e., INITIAL = FIRST5. Specifically, if the HIPOD1R t−1 t−2 corresponds to the first five deals, INITIAL is 1. This measure directly captures the learning-by-doing and building expertise processes with respect to HIPOs. Correspondingly, when INITIAL is 0, LATER is 1, and vice versa. We expect 1 to be negative based on H2. There are two noteworthy points about the proxy for INITIAL. First, the measurement of the proxies does not have a look-ahead bias in the sense that in any given year we do not need information about the future success of the investment bank to code the measure. On the other hand, LATER is more likely to be correlated with investment banks that are more successful (in terms of larger HIPO market shares). However, this correlation between LATER and higher market shares by itself need not lead to the differential relationship between day-one returns and market shares stated in H2. Second, as noted in the discussion of H2, disentangling the learning-by-doing and regime-change effects is difficult, given the small number of initial HIPOs handled by investment banks after the elimination of the quota system, even though we have the total population of HIPOs.
Panel B of Table 3 provides the results of estimating Equation (2). The first (last) column presents the results for INITIAL = PRE2000(INITIAL = FIRST5). The coefficient estimate on HIPOD1R in the PRE2000 period is −1.36 (t-statistic = −2 77) and on HIPOD1R in the POST2000 period is 0.28 (t-statistic = 7.49). The difference in the coefficients across PRE2000 and POST2000 is statistically significant (F -statistic = 11 03, p-value = 0 00). The coefficient estimate on HIPOD1R for the FIRST5 deals is −1.11 (t-statistic = −3 81) and on HIPOD1R for the later deals is −0.68 (t-statistic = −1 01). The difference in the coefficients across FIRST5 and AFTER5 is also statistically significant (F -statistic = 4.57, p-value = 0.03).
Repeating the analysis after eliminating observations with zero HIPOMS (160 observations), we find that (in untabulated results) the coefficient estimate on HIPOD1R in the PRE2000 period is −1.52 (t-statistic = −1 80), in the POST2000 period is 0.29 (t-statistic = 4.13), and the difference in the coefficients across PRE2000 and POST2000 is statistically significant (F -statistic = 4.54, p-value = 0.03); and the coefficient estimate on HIPOD1R for the FIRST5 deals is −1.13 (t-statistic = −2 19, for the later deals is −0.75 (t-statistic = −0 63), and the difference in the coefficients across FIRST5 and AFTER5 is statistically significant (F -statistic = 2.65, p-value = 0.07). In addition, repeating the analysis after eliminating observations with zero HKIPOMS (221 observations), we find that (in untabulated results) the coefficient estimate on HIPOD1R in the PRE2000 period is −0.93 (t-statistic = −6 33), in the POST2000 period is 0.30 (t-statistic = 0.78), and the difference in the coefficients across PRE2000 and POST2000 is statistically significant (F -statistic = 9.44, p-value = 0.00); and the coefficient estimate on HIPOD1R for the FIRST5 deals is −3.38 (t-statistic = −3 88), for the later deals is −0.33 (t-statistic = −0 39), and the difference in the coefficients across FIRST5 and AFTER5 is statistically significant (F -statistic = 6.28, p-value = 0.01). Collectively these findings indicate that the results in Table 2 are driven by PRE2000 HIPOs and the FIRST5 deals, as predicted in H2.
We note that not all of the 40 investment banks in our sample exist in both the INITIAL and the LATER groups. The results could thus be a manifestation of the differences in unobserved investment bank characteristics in the INITIAL group only and those in both the INITIAL and the LATER groups. To control for this possibility, we estimate the results for panel B of Table 3 including only those investment banks that exist in both the PRE2000 (i.e., INITIAL) and POST2000 (i.e., LATER) samples. In total there are 10 (out of 40) investment banks that satisfy this criterion, with a resulting sample of 130 observations (10 banks × 13 years). Similarly, for the INITIAL = FIRST5 specification, we estimate the results by including only those investment banks that exist in both FIRST5 (i.e., INITIAL) and AFTER5 (i.e., LATER) in the test sample. In total there are eight (out of 40) investment banks that satisfy this criterion, with a resulting sample of 104 observations (eight banks × 13 years). Similar to the results reported in panel B of Table 3 , results (not tabulated) show that the coefficients of HIPOD1R t−1 t−2 (INITIAL) are −1.52 (t-statistic = −1 80) and −1.13 (t-statistic = −2 19) when INITIAL = PRE2000 and = FIRST5, respectively; the HIPOD1R t−1 t−2 (LATER) values are 0.29 (t-statistic = 4.13) and −0.75 (t-statistic = −0 63) when LATER = POST2000 and = AFTER5, respectively.
In panel C, we estimate Equation (1) by aggregating the market share in the POST2000 period and using the PRE2000 period averages for the explanatory variables. The unit of analysis in this specification is the investment banks, and thus there are 40 observations. For each investment bank we compute the market share for the 2001-2007 period, and for each of the explanatory variables we compute the average for the 1993-2000 period. We consider this specification because the results of estimating Equations (1) and (2), presented in Tables 2 and 3 , panel B, may be driven by the presence of no HIPOs or HKIPOs in many of the years, especially for investment banks that have handled fewer IPOs. Therefore, we check the robustness of our results by aggregating them at the investment bank level. Second, this specification allows us to control for common trends in the HKIPOs and HIPOs. The left (right) column of panel C in Table 2 provides the estimation of HIPOs (HKIPOs). For HIPO market shares in the post-2000 period, the coefficient estimate on HIPOD1R(PRE2000) is −0.05 (t-statistic = −2 71); this is consistent with H2.
In the estimation using HKIPO market shares in the post-2000 period as the dependent variable, the coefficient estimate on HKIPOD1R(PRE2000) is 0.70 (t-statistic = 2.05). The difference in coefficients HIPOD1R(PRE2000) and HKIPOD1R(PRE2000) across the two estimations is statistically significant with an F -statistic of 4.83 (p-value = 0.03) based on the seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) procedures.
Additional Test: Probability of
Winning IPO Businesses As an additional test, we use the investment bank and the IPO as the unit of analysis to estimate the likelihood of a bank winning IPO business. This specification helps to sidestep measurement issues related to the allocation of the offer proceeds across investment banks if the IPO is handled by multiple banks. However, this analysis does not consider the overall competitive power in terms of larger market shares. As before, the assumption is that all of the investment banks compete for all of the HIPOs and HKIPOs. In this analysis, Win_HIPO (Win_HKIPO) is 1 for the investment bank that wins the HIPO (HKIPO) business and 0 for all of the other investment banks. We estimate Equation (1) The results are reported in panel A of Table 4 . The coefficient on HIPOD1R t−1 t−2 is −4.41 (chi-square statistic = 3.06, p-value = 0.09), suggesting that investment banks with less prior HIPO underpricing are more likely to win HIPO business; this is after controlling for prior HKIPO underpricing, prior period market shares, future returns, and future price volatilities. As for the likelihood of winning HKIPO business estimation, we find that it is not related to prior years' underpricing, i.e., HKIPOD1R t−1 t−2 . We repeat the analysis after eliminating observations with zero HIPODIR t−1 t−2 with 713 observations instead of 2,800 observations and find that the coefficient on HIPOD1R t−1 t−2 is −5.70 (chi-square statistic = 375, p-value = 0.05). These results support H1A. We also test H2 using an augmented Equation (2), based on the logit procedure. The results reported in panel B of Table 4 show that HIPOD1R t−1 t−2 (INITIAL), measured either by PRE2000 or by FIRST5, is negatively related to the likelihood of winning HIPO business in the current period; this is consistent with H2.
Entry into the HIPO Market and Subsequent
Entry into the China Markets-A Case Study and Additional Empirical Analyses Although the evidence thus far shows that investment banks that underprice HIPOs less will obtain higher subsequent HIPO market shares, there is no direct support for the argument that the knowledge they gain about China business helps them build their China business. In the development of the hypotheses we argue that one of the rationales for investment banks to underprice HIPOs to a lesser degree in the initial years is to gain expertise in doing business in China and to get a toehold in future lucrative business in China. In this section, we provide some direct evidence for the relationship between HIPO market shares and subsequent presence in the Chinese financial services market in two ways. First, we present a case study of a large Hong Kong investment bank that offered substantially lower HIPO underpricing in the initial years, and document three instances of this bank's subsequent gains in the Chinese financial services market. Second, we empirically examine whether an investment bank's greater market share in the HIPO market is related to a greater subsequent market share of Chinese company IPOs in the Chinese stock exchanges.
3.5.1. Case Study of a Large Investment Bank. We chose an investment bank from our sample that had one of the lowest HIPO underpricing in the initial years. We held informal discussions with top level vice presidents. The average HIPO underpricing by this investment bank was roughly −15% in the initial years, and the market share of the HIPOs in the later period was 11.4%, which was one of the largest; it was four times the naïve benchmark of 2.5%, which was based on a uniform distribution of the IPO business across the 40 banks. In our discussion with the topmanagement team about their strategy for entry into the Chinese financial services market, they indicated that the subsequent gains were possible because of the expertise they gained handling HIPOs in the Chinese market in the initial years. They pointed to the following three benefits in the Chinese financial services industry. First, the case study bank was chosen as the lead underwriter for one of the largest global Chinese company IPOs in the early 2000s. Second, the case study bank was one of the first non-China based investment banks to obtain approval from the China Securities Regulation Commission (CSRC), the Chinese regulator, to participate in the Chinese underwriting market; a large rival bank obtained similar approval four years later. The rival bank's average HIPO underpricing was roughly 35.6% in the initial years, and its subsequent HIPO market share was 0.9%. Our discussion revealed that the timing advantage was a major factor contributing to the growth of the first bank's China-based business. Third, more recently the case study bank was among the first to obtain a stock trading and brokerage license, after the Chinese government lifted the ban on foreign banks' participation at the end of 2007. This case suggests that the strategy of obtaining initial business of Chinese company IPOs in Hong Kong not only helped them increase their market share of the Chinese company IPOs in Hong Kong in later years, but also enabled them to gain a competitive advantage over their rivals in the Chinese financial services market.
Our discussions with the investment bank's officials did not indicate that they had adopted an explicit strategy of lower underpricing in the initial years. The officials stated that they made all efforts to obtain the initial HIPO business by helping issuers raise much needed capital (also see De Jonge 2008). They confirmed that the experience they gained from the HIPO business during the initial period helped them gain expertise in China-related business practices and to develop key relationships in China.
HIPO Market Shares and Subsequent
China IPO Market Shares in the Chinese Stock Exchanges. One of the case study investment bank's subsequent advantages was to obtain an underwriting license much earlier than its key rivals. We thus examine the relationship between HIPO market shares (in the Hong Kong Stock Exchange) and subsequent China IPO market shares in the Chinese stock exchanges. In particular, we examine the China IPO market shares of the 40 investment banks over the 1993-2007 period. We obtain data on the China IPOs (both A and B shares) handled by the 40 investment banks during the period in all of the Chinese stock exchanges from the CSMAR database. The sample consists of 147 China IPOs, handled by the 40 IBs. We estimate a similar model as in Equation (1) by substituting the China IPO market shares (ChIPOMS) as the dependent variable, using both A and B shares. Specifically, we estimate the following equation:
We use HIPOMS as the regressor instead of HIPOD1R because we propose that handling the HIPOs would have provided the investment bank with experience and expertise, and it is this expertise that is helpful in valuing China IPOs in Chinese stock exchanges. We expect the coefficient on the lagged HIPO market shares (HIPOMS t−1 t−2 to be positively associated with the current China IPO market shares, after controlling for the lagged China IPO market shares (ChIPOMS t−1 t−2 . We control for the uncertainty and investor demand factors by including the future stock returns and stock return volatilities, as in Equation (1).
The results are reported in Table 5 . In the first column, as expected, the coefficient on the lagged HIPOMS is positive, showing that IBs with HIPO higher market shares have a higher China IPO market share in later years. This is consistent with the notion that investment banks learn about the new market as they develop their HIPO market shares. In the second column, the results are similar after controlling for the future performance and price volatility of both the HIPOs and China HIPOs. In an unreported analysis, we include the investment banks' lagged HKIPO market shares as well, and find that they are not associated with the China IPO market share in the Chinese stock exchanges. Taken together the results suggest that getting HIPO market share enables investment banks to obtain financial services business in China. Rock 1986) , and that underpricing can increase the uninformed individual investors' demand (see Benveniste and Spindt 1989, Derrien 2005) . If investor demand for the HIPOs during the initial years is much greater than in later years, then HIPO underpricing could be a reflection of this trend. In general, if the demand from individual investors is systematically different for the HIPOs in the initial and later years, then this omitted variable could drive the results presented for Equations (1) and (2). We use the HIPOs and HKIPOs as the unit of analysis, and use the extensive literature on IPO underpricing to estimate the following equation:
where X i are control variables based on prior research on IPO underpricing; they are discussed briefly below. We include industry and year fixed effects to account for hot and cold periods and industries (Helwege and Liang 2004, Ljungqvist et al. 2006) . We correct the standard errors by clustering by year and industry. The test variables in Equation (3) are the interactions terms HIPO * INITIAL and HIPO * LATER. The coefficient 1 ( 1P ) is the difference in underpricing between HIPO and HKIPO in the initial (later) years. Based on H2, we expect 1 ( 1P ) to be negative (zero). The large theoretical and empirical literature on IPO underpricing shows that IPO underpricing is associated with (a) informational differences across the parties (i.e., the issuer, the investment bank, and the investors); (b) institutional reasons such as tax and legal liability regimes; (c) investor make-up and corporate control considerations; and (d) investor sentiment and recognition (see Ljungqvist 2006 for a review). We control for these as discussed below.
IPO-Specific Factors. Following previous studies on IPO underpricing, we control for the following IPO-related and institutional factors: (a) firmsize (LNSALE), measured as the log of past years' sales revenues, to control for information asymmetry, which is expected to be negatively related to underpricing (e.g., Ritter 1984, Smart and Zutter 2003) ; (b) first-day trading volume scaled by the number of shares offered (TURN), to control for investor recognition and sentiment, which is expected to be positively related to underpricing (Ofek and Richardson 2003) ; (c) float (FLOAT), measured as the number of shares offered scaled by the total number of shares after the IPO, to control for corporate control effects, which is expected to be positively related to underpricing (Ljungqvist 2006); offer price revision (Revisionpc), which is the final offer price minus the midpoint of the offer price range (or the initial offer price, as announced in the prospectus) divided by the initial offer price, to measure the information gathered by the investment banks during the bookbuilding phase, which is expected to be negatively related to underpricing (Loughran and Ritter 2002 , Lowry and Schwert 2002 , Smart and Zutter 2003 . We include the offer size (LnProceeds), measured as the logarithm of offer price times the number of shares offered, to control for the investment banks' marketing efforts, especially because the offer sizes of the HIPOs are much larger than those of the HKIPOs.
Profitability, Growth, and Risk Factors. The lower underpricing of the HIPOs compared to that of the HKIPOs could be due to the quota system that restricts the supply of HIPOs to "showcase" extraordinary performers (Ferguson et al. 2002) . We address this potential alternative explanation for H1 by controlling for profitability, growth, and risk characteristics of the IPOs. Differences in profitability, growth, and risk characteristics across the HKIPOs and HIPOs are likely to be related to underpricing through their information difference effects and investor sentiment effects.
We measure the operations in China using an indicator variable, PRCops, that takes a value of 1 if the IPO has operations in China and 0 otherwise. Given the growth potential in China and the media attention, we expect it to be positively related to underpricing (see Cook et al. 2008) . We control for profitability and growth using past years' return on sales (ROS) and the expected earnings in the IPO year provided in the prospectus and the last years' earnings ( ExpNI), respectively. 20 We expect profitability and growth to be incorporated into the offer price valuation and thus to be negatively related to underpricing. FundUse is the percentage of total IPO proceeds to be used for capital expansion or working capital needs. FundUse measures growth potential and investor sentiment, and thus we expect it to be positively related to underpricing. The standard deviation of return on sales over the past three years, STDROS, is a risk measure that is likely to influence investor sentiment negatively, and thus is expected to be positively related to underpricing.
Governance Factors. Although Hong Kong is regarded as one of "the world's freest economies" (Index of Economic Freedom website http://www .heritage.org/index/), China is ranked much lower in terms of legal protection, rule of law, and transparency (see, e.g., Goldie-Scott 1995 , Chan 1996 , Peng et al. 1998 . 21 In contrast to Hong Kong, factors such as a lower rate of tax compliance, higher corruption, and the lack of a free press contribute to higher private benefits of control for Chinese firms.
22 Following Fan et al. (2007) , we consider the following controls: (a) Govt_Official takes a value of 1 if the CEO or the Chairman is a government official; (b) Dual is an indicator variable that is 1 if the CEO and the chairman are the same; (c) TotalDIR is the total number of people on the board of directors; (d) IndepDIR is the number of independent directors on the board; and (e) Ownpc is the ownership percentage held by directors, families, and government. If good governance is positively related to investor sentiment, we expect good governance to be positively related to underpricing (see Filatotchev and Bishop 2002) . However, if good governance is indicative of how well the firm monitors the investment bank for agency issues, then we expect good governance to be negatively related to underpricing.
Investment Bank Quality. Investment bank quality has been shown to be both positively and negatively related to IPO underpricing (see Hoberg 2007) . The investment bank quality variable (IBQUAL) is based on the market share of the investment bank's IPO business (see, e.g., Fang 2005) . IBQUAL is 1 if the investment bank handles more than 5% of all of the IPOs. Given the mixed results in previous studies, we do not provide an empirical prediction for this control variable.
Macroeconomic Variables. Given that the higher underpricing of HIPOs compared to HKIPOs in the later years could be due to increased investor recognition by foreign investors over time, we consider country-level/exchange-level macroeconomic 21 These concerns are summarized in the prospectuses of HIPOs in boiler-plate risk disclosures that typically are of the following form: "you should pay particular attention to the fact that we are a PRC company and are governed by a legal and regulatory environment that in some respects differs from that which prevails in other countries." Paul Vibert, a China analyst for Baring Securities, says, "H-shares are fundamentally better than B shares, but still you cannot make a comparison between an H-share and a blue chip Hong Kong stock" (see Anonymous 1993) . Also see Loong (1998) , Lucas (1999) , and Aharony et al. (2000) . 22 Dyck and Zingales (2004) provide examples of how these factors affect private benefits of control.
variables. First, we include the extent of foreign capital attracted to China by the growth potential; for this purpose, we consider the data on foreign direct investment in China obtained from the World Bank (FDIChina). We also consider the changes in stock market capitalization in the Hong Kong market, using data obtained from the World Bank (ChMV-HK); the data for the H-share market is obtained from the Hong Kong Stock Exchange (ChMV-Hshare). These variables are included to control for trends in investor recognition across the two share types. We also include the changes in market capitalization in the Chinese stock exchanges (ChMV-China) to control for the evolution of China into a more market-based economy. In addition, we include a TREND variable to control for trends in underpricing in the Hong Kong Stock Exchange.
Empirical Analyses and Results. Panel A of Table 6 contains the descriptive statistics for the HIPOs and HKIPOs. Notably, the HIPOs and HKIPOs are different across many of the investigated characteristics. It is thus important to control for these differences. Panel B of Table 6 reports the result of estimating Equation (3); the left (right) column presents the results when INITIAL = PRE2000 (INITIAL = FIRST5). We present the results of the IPO characteristic control variables, and suppress the profitability, growth, risk, corporate governance, and macroeconomic variables, because they are in general not statistically significant. 23 When INITIAL = PRE2000, the coefficient on the HIPO in the PRE2000 period is −0.17 (t-statstic = −13 42) indicating that in the initial years, i.e., 1993 to 2000, the HIPOs are underpriced less than the HKIPOs. The difference across HIPO(PRE2000) and HIPO(POST2000) has an F -statistic of 3.78 (p-value = 0.02). This is consistent with H2.
When INITIAL = FIRST5, the coefficient on HIPO for the first five deals is −0.13 (t-statistic = −2.09) indicating that the first few HIPO deals handled by a given investment bank are underpriced less than the HKIPOs. The coefficient on the HIPOs for the later deals is 0.22 (t-statistic = 1.58), indicating that HIPO underpricing in later years is statistically similar (albeit weakly) to HKIPO underpricing. The difference in the coefficients HIPO(INITIAL) and HIPO(LATER) is also statistically significant, with an F -statistic of 2.97 (p-value = 0.05). Collectively, these results support H2. 24 23 Out of the control variables only Govt_Official is positive and significant in the estimation with INITIAL = PRE2000; all others are statistically insignificant at the 10% level. 24 We have conducted a number of sensitivity analyses to ensure the robustness of these results. For example, we (1) match HIPOs with HKIPOs based on investment bank, industry, and size; (2) exclude 
Concluding Remarks
In our examination of the relationship between investment banks' IPO market shares and prior IPO underpricing in the new H-shares IPO market in the Hong non-SOE HIPOs; (3) include in the sample also HKIPOs handled by investment banks that do not have any experience in handling HIPOs. We obtained similar results.
Kong Stock Exchange, we find that the lesser the IPO underpricing of the H-shares by an investment bank, the greater its subsequent market share in the H-share IPOs. This result is driven by the initial deals/years. We also find that the greater an investment bank's market share in the H-share IPO market in Hong Kong, the greater its subsequent market share in the China IPO market in the Chinese stock exchanges.
Further, through a case study, we demonstrate that a large investment bank with substantially less HIPO underpricing and high HIPO market share in the initial years obtained important licenses for providing financial services in China in subsequent years. Collectively these results suggest that investment banks' initial market shares in new markets help them grow their market share in later periods. Our evidence of lower HIPO underpricing for the initial deals is also consistent with the institutional feature of eliminating quotas for the HIPOs in 2000. Because it is not possible to separate the effect of the change in the institutional setting from the effect of the gain in investment bank expertise in valuing HIPOs, our results, specifically that the HKIPOs and HIPOs exhibit similar underpricing in later years, should be interpreted as a joint effect of both of these factors. However, to the extent that the elimination of the quota system helped investment banks compete by targeting potential HIPO firms that are within their expertise, our conclusion that investment banks use a strategy of lower underpricing in the initial years to
Appendix. Variable Definitions
Variable Definition
Variables used in the investment bank level analysis HIPOMS t An investment bank's (IB) market share of China-based company (H-share) IPOs (HIPO) in the Hong Kong Stock Exchange, computed as the offer proceeds of the HIPOs handled by an IB in year t, divided by the total offer proceeds of all of the HIPOs during that year, i.e., HIPOMS = (offer proceeds of HIPOs handled by that IB in year t)/ total offer proceeds of all of the HIPOs in year t. If there is more than one lead investment bank handling an HIPO, the offer proceeds are allocated equally among the lead IBs.
HIPOMS t−1 t−2
The mean HIPOMS of an IB over the past two years.
HIPOD1R t−1 t−2 For each HIPO, the day-one returns, D1R, is computed as the difference between end of first trading day stock price, P1, and offer price, P0, divided by the offer price, P0, i.e., D1R = (P1 − P0)/P0. HIPOD1R t−1 t−2 is the offer size-weighted mean day-one returns, D1R, of the HIPOs handled by the investment bank during the past two years.
PRE2000
An indicator variable that is 1 for years prior to 2001 and 0 otherwise.
POST2000
An indicator variable that 1 for years after 2000 and 0 otherwise.
FIRST5
An indicator variable that 1 for the first five HIPO deals handled by an investment bank and 0 otherwise.
AFTER5
An indicator variable that 1 for the subsequent HIPO deals handled by an investment bank after the first five deals and 0 otherwise.
HKIPOMS t
An investment bank's (IB) market share of Hong Kong company IPOs (HKIPO) in the Hong Kong Stock Exchange, computed as the offer proceeds of the HKIPOs handled by an IB in year t divided by the total offer proceeds of all of the HKIPOs handled during that year, i.e., HKIPOMS = (offer proceeds of HKIPOs handled by the IB in year t)/total offer proceeds of all of the HKIPOs in year t. If there is more than one lead investment bank handling an HKIPO, the offer proceeds are allocated equally among the lead IBs.
HIPOMS t−1 t−2
The mean HKIPOMS of an IB over the past two years.
HKIPOD1R t−1 t−2 For each HKIPO, the day-one returns, D1R, is computed as the difference between the end of first trading day stock price, P1, and offer price, P0, divided by the offer price, P0, i.e., D1R = (P1 − P0)/P0. HKIPOD1R t−1 t−2 is the offer size-weighted mean day-one returns, D1R, of the HKIPOs handled by the investment bank during the past two years.
HIPORET3 t−1 t−2 For each HIPO, the cumulative abnormal returns are computed for the three years following the HIPO, HIPOCUMABRET3. For each IB in year t, HIPORET3 t−1 t−2 is the offer size-weighted mean HIPOCUMABRET3 computed for the HIPOs it handled in years t − 1 and t − 2.
gain expertise and compete is appropriate. Furthermore, although our finding that HIPO underpricing is lower in the initial years/deals is consistent with our hypotheses, it should be interpreted with caution. This result is also consistent with the explanation that investor demand for HIPOs was much less in the initial years than in later years. Future research can examine whether similar results are found in other new and emerging markets.
